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ABSTRACT
I am aware of the red and orange autumn leaves. Am I aware of my awareness of
the leaves? Not so according to many philosophers. By contrast, many
meditative traditions report an experience of awareness itself. I argue that
such a pure awareness experience must have a non-sensory phenomenal
character. I use Douglas Harding’s ﬁrst-person experiments for assisting in
recognising pure awareness. In particular, I investigate the gap where one
cannot see one’s head. This is not a mere gap because I seem to be looking
from here. Critically, I claim, the experience of looking from here has a non-
sensory phenomenal character. I argue that this sense of being aware cannot
be reduced to egocentric visual-spatial relations nor the viewpoint because it
continues when I close my eyes. Neither is a multisensory origin suﬃcient to
explain why I seem to be at this central point rather than elsewhere.
Traditionally, claims of a pure awareness experience have been restricted to
highly trained individuals in very restricted circumstances. The innovation of
Harding’s approach is that it reliably isolates a candidate for pure awareness
using methods which can be replicated at any time.
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1. Introduction
I see the red and orange leaves of autumn and hear birds singing. I am
aware of objects in the world. But am I aware of my awareness of these
things? It seems that my awareness is elusive. I look for it, but can only
ﬁnd objects and their properties. While I know that I see an ant, according
to Dretske, ‘I don’t see myself see an ant’ (Dretske 2003, 8). Many philoso-
phers have denied that awareness can be experientially distinguished
from the objects of awareness.1 James (1904) held that experience ‘has
© 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
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1Here the term ‘object’ is used in a wide sense to include not just perceived objects, but also feelings,
thoughts, pains and mental images.
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no such inner duplicity’ (480).2 Evans (1970, 53–55) denied that there a dis-
cernible common property shared by all experiences. Dainton (2002) could
ﬁnd no such ‘gaze of consciousness’. These observations are closely
related to the transparency (or diaphanousness) of experience, the pur-
ported phenomenological fact that when I try to introspect the qualities
of my experiences, I am only aware of properties of objects, such as the
qualities of a leaf. The greenness is a property of the object, not apparently
a quality of consciousness. I can attend to a green thing, but not to a green
experience. That is, metaphorically speaking, when I look for my experi-
ences, I ‘see through’ them to objects in the world (Tye 2002, 139). Experi-
ence, therefore, is ‘transparent’ (Campbell in Campbell and Cassam 2014;
Dretske 1995; Harman 1990; Martin 2002; Shoemaker 1996; Tye 1995,
2002, 2014. For doubts about transparency, see Block 1996; Kind 2003;
Pace 2007; Siewert 2004).
By contrast, philosophers inﬂuenced by meditative traditions hold that
awareness itself also contributes to the experiencing of the leaves (Alba-
hari 2009; Deikman 1996; Fasching 2008; Gupta 1998; Shear 1998). A
common experience in meditation is that of watching thoughts, feelings
and sounds arising and disappearing, while awareness itself seems to
remain unchanged. There is a polarity within experience between the
objects of awareness and awareness itself (Deikman 1996; Fasching
2008). This aspect has been referred to as ‘Witness Consciousness’ (Alba-
hari 2009; Gupta 1998; Fasching 2011). Hence the phenomenology of
seeing leaves is not exhausted by the shape and colours of the leaves.
Awareness itself makes a unique and continuous phenomenal diﬀerence
over and above sensory qualities. This experiencing of awareness itself, I
will refer to as a ‘pure awareness experience’. A pure awareness experience
is referred to in meditative traditions from diverse cultures. Prominent
examples are the Advaita Vedanta (Gupta 1998), Yogācāra Buddhism
(Lusthaus 2014), Tibetan Buddhism (Fremantle 2001) and mystical tra-
ditions (Forman 1990, 1999; Shear 1998).
If awareness has its own phenomenal character, it seems to be particu-
larly diﬃcult to grasp. G. E. Moore seems to refer to the elusiveness of
awareness when in a famous passage he states:
2James complains that with Kant and the neo-Kantians ‘the spiritual principle attenuates itself to a
thoroughly ghostly condition, being only a name for the fact that the ‘content’ of experience is
known. It loses personal form and activity – these passing over to the content – and becomes a bare
Bewusstheit (awareness) or Bewusstein uberhaupt (consciousness in general), of which in its own right
absolutely nothing can be said. I believe that ‘consciousness,’ once it has evaporated to this state of
pure diaphaneity, is on the point of disappearing altogether. It is the name of a nonentity, and has
no right to a place among ﬁrst principles’ (James 1904, 477). (Bracketed terms added).
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Though philosophers have recognised that something distinct is meant by con-
sciousness, they have never yet had a clear conception of what that something
is. They have not been able to hold it and blue before their minds and to
compare them, in the same way in which they can compare blue and green.
And this for the reason I gave above: namely that the moment we try to ﬁx
our attention upon consciousness and to see what, distinctly, it is, it seems to
vanish: it seems as if we had before us a mere emptiness. When we try to intro-
spect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue: the other element is as if it
were diaphanous. Yet it can be distinguished if we look attentively enough, and
if we know that there is something to look for. (Moore 1903, 450)
Moore further says that consciousness is the ‘common element’ between
all sensations (450) and explicitly uses the term ‘awareness’ interchange-
ably with ‘consciousness’. According to Moore then, awareness is
elusive, yet experienceable. Moore (1903) is often credited as the historical
origin of the transparency of experience, yet this passage suggests that he
thought experiencing awareness itself was in fact possible.3 If awareness
makes a phenomenal difference in addition to the character of its
objects (or sensory qualities) this would provide evidence against aware-
ness being exhausted by sensory qualitative phenomenal properties.
Moore says that one can experience their awareness if they ‘look atten-
tively enough’. But how exactly? In this regard, the philosopher Douglas
Harding has much to oﬀer. Harding developed an unconventional
method of self-inquiry which has so far received little attention from
other philosophers (though see: Blackmore 2011, 63–65; Fasching 2008;
Harris 2014, 141–148; Ramm, 2017).4 In particular, Harding provided sys-
tematic practical instructions – ﬁrst-person experiments – for carrying
out Moore’s advice. I will guide the reader through some of these exper-
iments, the goal being to experience awareness for one’s self. There is a
seemingly irreconcilable disagreement between philosophers over
whether one can experience awareness itself, over and above sensory
phenomenal qualities, emotions, etc. If ﬁrst-person methods could reliably
isolate a candidate for pure awareness, this would be a signiﬁcant result in
advancing our understanding of consciousness.
3A common reading of Moore in this passage is that he is talking about qualia (phenomenal properties) as
being diaphanous: Block (1996, 26–27), Kind (2003, 229), Tye (1992, 160), Tye (2002, 139), Kennedy
(2009, 574–577), Speaks (2009, 539), Stoljar (2004, 341). In fact, in the context of Moore referring to ‘con-
sciousness’ as the ‘common element’ to all sensations it is clear that he is referring to awareness as dia-
phanous (yet distinguishable): see, Albahari (2009, 62–63, 70, 76–77, 83), Fasching (2008, 465), Forman
(1999, 112); Metzinger (2003, section 3.2.7).
4Harding’s book, On Having No Head ﬁrst published in 1961 and updated in 1986 (Harding 1961), is
regarded as a spiritual classic. Excerpts appear in Hofstadter and Dennett (1981).
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This ﬁrst-person inquiry also has consequences for attempts to explain
consciousness. The focus on solving the hard problem of consciousness
(Chalmers 1995) has been on explaining experiences such as what it is
like to see magenta, feel anger, and think about Pi. Explaining these
aspects of consciousness arguably leaves untouched the awareness
that many claim is common to all experiences. From the perspective of
meditative traditions and those inﬂuenced by these traditions, the view
that consciousness is exhausted by sensory, aﬀective, and cognitive
character is an impoverished notion of consciousness. If correct, we
could conceivably explain these properties of consciousness, but leave
unexplained awareness itself, arguably the essence of consciousness
(see Albahari 2009).
The plan for the paper is as follows: I characterise ‘pure awareness’ in
Section 2. In Section 3, I employ ﬁrst-person experiments from Douglas
Harding for recognising pure awareness. In Section 4, I argue that the view-
point does not explain the phenomenology of pure awareness. I make
some concluding remarks in Section 5.
2. Pure awareness
2.1. Characterising the pure awareness experience
An aspect of the experience of pure awareness which I will focus on in this
paper is the claim that it is non-sensory in character. In the words of ‘The
Tibetan Book of the Dead’:
This brilliant emptiness is the radiant essence of your own awareness. It is
beyond substance, beyond characteristics, beyond colour… The instant of
your own presence is empty, yet it is not a nihilistic emptiness, but unimpeded
radiance, brilliant and vibrant… Your own awareness, a vast luminous expanse,
clarity inseparable from emptiness, is also the Buddha of unchanging light,
beyond birth and death. Just to perceive this is enough. If you recognize this bril-
liant essence of your own awareness as Buddha Nature, then gazing into it is to
abide in the state of enlightenment. (Padmasambhava and Lingpa 2013, 14–15)
To be empty is to lack inherent self-existence. Pure awareness is empty,
but not a mere emptiness (non-existence) because it is luminous. Radiance
or luminosity is the ‘illuminating potential of the mind’ (Fremantle 2001,
199). It is described as pure and transparent and often used interchange-
ably with ‘clear light’. This awareness is colourless and shapeless. It is
empty and clear but is nevertheless able to be experienced. The realisation
of luminosity is the experience of naked awareness or Buddha Nature
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(Fremantle 2001, 232). Of course, terms such as ‘luminous’ and ‘radiant’ are
intriguing, but in the end are just visual metaphorical terms to refer to
awareness.5 Alternatively, to the term ‘awareness’, the phenomenon
could be referred to as the ‘knowing aspect’ of experiencing, as distinct
from the objects known (Albahari 2006, 8; Thompson 2014, xxi).
Whilst inspired by traditional sources, the following characterisation of
pure awareness is predominately based upon philosophical and phenom-
enological considerations, rather than an exegesis of traditional texts. I will
understand ‘pure awareness’ by the following set of characteristics:
(1) It is the common element to all experiencing.
(2) It lacks sensory and aﬀective phenomenal qualities normally associ-
ated with consciousness such as colour, shape, sound, taste, emotional
qualities, and so forth.
(3) It has a sui generis non-sensory, non-aﬀective phenomenal character.
(4) It is non-cognitive.
(5) It is experienced non-objectifyingly.
I elaborate on these characteristics below:
(1) It is the common element to all experiencing.
As Moore (1903) states it:
We all know that the sensation of blue diﬀers from that of green. But it is plain
that if both are sensations they also have some point in common. What is it that
they have in common? And how is this common element related to the points in
which they diﬀer? I will call the common element ‘consciousness’ without yet
attempting to say what the thing I so call is. We have then in every sensation
two distinct terms, (1) ‘consciousness,’ in respect of which all sensations are
alike; and (2) something else, in respect of which one sensation diﬀers from
another. It will be convenient if I may be allowed to call this second term the
‘object’ of a sensation: this also without yet attempting to say what I mean by
the word. (Moore 1903, 450)
This awareness is common to all sensory modalities. Albahari (2009) refers
to it as a ‘mode-neutral awareness’. A reason for thinking that mode-
neutral awareness exists is the unity of consciousness.6 Take the
5For detailed overviews of the concept of luminosity as it has been used in Buddhist traditions see Mack-
enzie (2017) and Skorupski (2012).
6Providing a deﬁnition of the unity of consciousness would go beyond the scope of this paper. See, Bayne
(2010), Bayne and Chalmers (2003), Brook and Raymont (2014), Cleeremans (2003), Dainton (2000) and
Tye (2003).
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experience of gardening as an example. I am aware of the plants and their
colours and shapes, the smell of the soil and the warmth of the sun. I am
aware of all of these things simultaneously. There is a uniﬁed experience.
This suggests that there is an awareness which encompasses all of these
sensory modalities, and is hence neutral between modalities. I add that
it also has to be intra-mode neutral (e.g. neutral between colours, as
well as neutral between visual and auditory phenomenology) so that I
can be simultaneously aware of all the sensory properties within a
modality (e.g. the multi-coloured garden scene).
(2) It lacks sensory and aﬀective phenomenal qualities normally associ-
ated with consciousness such as colour, shape, sound, taste, emotional
qualities and so forth.
Why think that awareness is pure in the sense of lacking sensory
phenomenal qualities in itself? If awareness had any sensory or aﬀective
phenomenal qualities whatsoever, then it would be incompatible with
being the common aspect to all experiences. If awareness was red for
instance, it would be like looking through red cellophane such that all
blue things would appear purple. If awareness is the common element
in blue, red, green, yellow etc. experiences, then it cannot be blue, red,
green, or yellow, rather it must be colourless. If awareness is common to
all shape sensations, it cannot be square, circular, triangular, etc. but
must be shapeless. To be compatible with all colours, shapes, sounds,
etc. then awareness must, in itself, be colourless, shapeless, silent, etc.
As Shear and Jevning (1999) point out, only a consciousness that is
devoid of sensory qualities could possess ‘omni-compatibility’ with all
sensory phenomena.
(3) It has a sui generis non-sensory, non-aﬀective phenomenal character.
Pure awareness should be distinguished from a bare awareness which
has no phenomenal character at all. To be experienceable pure awareness
must make a phenomenal diﬀerence, that is, it must have its own unique
non-sensory, non-aﬀective phenomenal character. Otherwise phenomen-
ologically speaking such an awareness would not exist (Albahari 2009;
Dainton 2002; Thompson 2015, 19). As Dainton (2002, 45–46) points out,
phenomenal character need not be restricted to sensory qualities such
as tastes, sounds and colours:
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A consciousness which consists of nothing but a feeling of void-like emptiness
has a deﬁnite (if diﬃcult to describe) phenomenal character. An ‘awareness’ of
this kind is tangible rather than pure, even if it is natural to describe it as
‘pure’. By contrast, a truly bare awareness has absolutely no phenomenal char-
acter of any kind, and so is subjectively indistinguishable from non-existence.
I will continue to use the term ‘pure’ here as ‘pure awareness’ is one of the
standard terms for this form of awareness, though it should be kept in
mind that by this I mean what Dainton calls ‘tangible awareness’.
(4) It is non-cognitive.
Cognitive phenomenology is the conscious experience of thinking that
P, desiring that P, intending that P, etc. which is held to have a non-sensory
phenomenal character (Horgan and Tienson 2002; Pitt 2004; Siewert 1998;
Strawson 1994). Pure awareness, however, is non-cognitive. It is present
with all conscious episodes including when there are no conscious
thoughts. There are frequently at least brief moments such as when I
am looking at a sunset in which I am not thinking at all, but I am neverthe-
less still seem to be aware.
(5) It is experienced non-objectifyingly.
Though awareness is known by direct experience it is not experienced
as an object of awareness; Rather awareness is experienced non-objectify-
ingly. As an example, Sartre states ‘consciousness of consciousness –
except in the case of reﬂective consciousness… is not positional, which
is to say that consciousness is not for itself its own object’ (Sartre 1957,
40–41). As Fasching states it, ‘by just observing, one experiences oneself
non-observationally as the observing itself, as ‘pure seeing’ (Fasching
2008, 470).
According to Buddhist thinkers Dignāga, Dharmakirti, and Santaraksita,
awareness has an inbuilt self-awareness – it is ‘self-luminous’ (Mackenzie
2007). It illuminates itself at the same time as illuminating its objects.
There is no higher-order awareness directed at awareness, which takes
awareness as its own object. This view is also found in the Upanishads
(Gupta 1998). This is a reﬂexive, or ﬁrst-order, notion of awareness of
awareness. A similar position is also widely held by phenomenologists
such as Husserl, Sartre, Gurwitsch and Merleau-Ponty (Gallagher and
Zahavi 2010; Zahavi 2005) and also by a number of contemporary
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philosophers (Albahari 2009; Deikman 1996; Kriegel 2003, 2009; Montague
2016; Nida-Rümelin 2014; Strawson 2011, 2015; Zahavi and Kriegel 2015).
I am also inclined to say that awareness is intrinsically self-aware (and
hence self-aware at all times). However, the phenomenology investigated
in this paper is also compatible with an alternative view in which the sense
of being aware comes and goes, rather than being present with all epi-
sodes of experiencing. Consider, for example, states of absorption in an
object of experience. This state may well involve a loss of all sense of
being aware. Awareness would always be present, but it would sometimes
(or perhaps frequently) be unaware of itself. The important point for
present purposes is that awareness is at least sometimes experienceable
and that it is not experienced as an object of awareness.
I will be focused on isolating a non-sensory phenomenal character of
pure awareness using the visual modality. I will hence be setting aside
the non-auditory, non-tactile, non-aﬀective (and so forth) character of
pure awareness. It should be emphasised that the goal is to experience
awareness via the visual modality, rather than ‘in’ the visual modality.7
The idea here is that a mode-neutral awareness can be experienced by
using the visual modality, but awareness is not itself in any sensory
modality. Rather awareness encompasses all sensory modalities. Another
common gateway to experiencing pure awareness is via the auditory
modality, in particular, it is often described as a ‘silent awareness’ under-
lying heard sounds (e.g. Forman 1998, 193–194).
2.2. Two types of pure awareness experience
It has been claimed by many that pure awareness can be recognised in a
deep meditative state – a Pure Awareness Experience (or event) (PAE). This
has been characterised as ‘a wakeful though contentless (nonintentional)
consciousness’ Forman (1990, 8), and as possessing ‘no phenomenal
content at all, no colours, sounds, thoughts, anticipations, etc… In short,
the experience is simply awareness itself’ (Shear and Jevning 1999, 195).
As there are no objects of experience it is a state in which there is no
subject-object duality. According to Yogic, Advaita Vedanta, and Tibetan
Buddhist traditions, objectless pure awareness is also naturally experi-
enced in dreamless sleep (Thompson 2014). Recently, Thompson (2014,
2015), Windt (2015), and Windt, Nielsen, and Thompson (2016) argue
that sleep studies of subjects reporting being aware during dreamless
7Contrary to what I said elsewhere (Ramm, 2017, 148). Thanks to Miri Albahari for making this point to me.
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sleep provide evidence for these traditional accounts of objectless pure
awareness experience.
I understand such experiences to mean a conscious state in which there
is awareness of awareness but no objects of awareness. I assume that
nevertheless a PAE has a unique phenomenal character even if there are
no objects of awareness, and no sensory phenomenal character. While
Shear and Jevning (1999) do say that it has ‘no phenomenal content’
(195), I read them as saying that it does not have sensory qualities,
rather than having no phenomenal character at all, otherwise it could
not be categorised as being an experience. In any case, this is how I will
understand this type of experience. Let us call this an Objectless Pure
Awareness Experience. This can be distinguished from an Object-Directed
Pure Awareness Experience. In the latter, there is an experience of an
awareness which has a non-sensory phenomenal character (pure aware-
ness), simultaneously with there being objects of awareness and sensory
phenomenal properties. In fact, most (if not all) experiences will have
objects of awareness and sensory phenomenal properties however
vague and hence sensory phenomenal character. This is my experience,
though I am not an advanced meditator. I remain neutral as to whether
or not there can be a truly Objectless PAE. The aim of this paper is to
ﬁnd an Object-Directed PAE rather than an Objectless PAE.8
3. First-person methods
In this section, I use ﬁrst-person experiments developed by Douglas
Harding as a means for distinguishing awareness, in particular pure aware-
ness, from the objects of awareness. These experiments are conducted
using the visual modality, and hence the focus is on isolating pure aware-
ness visually.9
The ﬁrst-person experiments used here consist of three main com-
ponents: The ﬁrst component is going by how things seem rather than
8Stace (1961) makes a similar distinction between ‘introvertive’ and ‘extrovertive’ mystical experiences.
‘The extrovertive experience looks outward through the senses, while the introvertive looks inward
into the mind’ (61). The latter involves ‘a state of pure consciousness – "pure" in the sense that it is
not the consciousness of any empirical content. It has no content except itself’ (86). Shear (1998)
eludes to the Object-Directed PAE where he says ‘after one’s attention has been drawn frequently to
pure consciousness in meditation (with all other objects of awareness absent), it should become possible
to recognize it at will afterward, even when the other ordinary components of experience have returned
to one’s awareness… as meditation traditions often report’ (681). Forman (1999) refers to the ‘dualistic
mystical experience’ as an inner silence that is experienced ‘concurrently with changing external experi-
ences, including thinking and feeling’ (150) (see also Forman 1998, 193–197).
9Experiment 1 is from Harding. Experiments 2, 3, and 4 are my own variants on his experimental method.
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how you believe them to be. For example, in viewing the Müller-Lyer illu-
sion, I would judge that the lines look diﬀerent in length, even though I
believe that they are actually equal in length. In particular, this method
involves setting aside the third-person perspective and simply taking
your experience exactly as it is given. The second component is dis-
tinguishing by phenomenal contrast (Siegel 2007). Here two phenomena
are compared so as to make salient the phenomenal diﬀerence between
them. Thirdly, unlike standard forms of ‘introspection’ these methods use
apparatus such as a pointing ﬁnger to make the phenomenal contrast and
to assist in orienting attention to the target phenomenon. In particular, the
aim of the following ﬁrst-person experiments is to provide systematic
methods, via the manipulation of attention, of contrasting awareness
with the objects of awareness exactly as Moore suggests we need to.10
3.1. Experiment 1: the pointing experiment
Please do the following. Use your ﬁnger to point at a wall. Notice that you
are pointing at a thing with colour, shape and texture. Point at the ﬂoor
and notice its various colours and textures. Now point at your foot and
then slowly trace your pointing ﬁnger up your body noticing its three-
dimensional volume, and various colours and textures of your limbs and
clothes. Finally turn your ﬁnger around so that it is pointing where
others see your face. On present experience do you seem to be pointing
at a face? Are there any colours here? Shapes? Textures? Movement? Any
personally identifying attributes such as name, gender, race, or species? I
ﬁnd that these characteristics are all missing from this spot. Rather this is
apparently just a gap, or open space.11 Recall, that lack of colour, shape
etc. is exactly what was predicted to be a deﬁning characteristic (or lack
of characteristic) of awareness, so we have found a plausible candidate
for pure awareness.12
3.2. Experiment 2: ﬁnding awareness
Where are you looking from? Hold up your hand in front of you. Are you
looking from the left of the hand? The right of the hand? Or is the place
10For a defence of ﬁrst-person experiments, see Ramm (2018).
11By ‘space’ I do not mean the space of physics, but rather I use it as a descriptive term in the sense of a
gap or opening, and also in terms of it seemingly functioning as room or capacity (in a container sense)
for the scene.
12For examples of the pointing experiment see: Harding (1961, 42–43, 1990, 8–9, 41–42; 2000, 8–9), Lang
(2003, 6–7).
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you are looking from located at 180 degrees from the hand? I ﬁnd the
latter. I am aware from here. To further test this try pointing outwards at
various objects. I ﬁnd that I point at objects such as a table, a chair, and
a wall. I see things and surfaces that are composed of shapes and
colours, but at no time do I actually point at my awareness. Certainly, I
am aware of the objects, but I am pointing at the objects not my aware-
ness of the objects. There is no awareness out there on present evidence.
By a process of elimination the only place left to look for my awareness is
right here, by turning the arrow of my attention around 180 degrees.
Another means of phrasing the question is: in which direction do I ﬁnd
myself as looker? In my experience, it is only by pointing inwards, and
not outwards, that I am pointing at the looker, and all I mean here by
looker is ‘that which is visually conscious’. I am visually aware from here,
not from any other direction.13
3.3. A visual blind spot?
One response to the experiments is to hold that I, in fact, experience
nothing in this direction. It is merely a visual blind spot. Eyes cannot
look backwards, and so there is no information to receive from this
location, and so, of course, I see nothing here. It is merely a visual
absence. The problem with my above descriptions according to the objec-
tion is that it confuses a complete lack of visual experience, with an experi-
ence that lacks visual sensory properties. As Daniel Dennett puts it, ‘an
absence of information is not the same as information about an
absence’ (Dennett 1991, 324). Perhaps then it should be described as a
bare lack of visual experience, a pure visual absence.
A pure visual absence can be contrasted with a blind spot that has
experiential contents. For example, when my foot is occluded by the
table, I see the table but not my foot. The experience is of the table (not
nothing). This is a blind spot by occlusion. Another type of blind spot is a
blind spot by vacancy. Examples of these blind spots are holes and gaps.
For example, when I look at a gap formed by a doorway there is a character
of emptiness to the experience. A pure blind spot, or pure visual absence,
on the other hand has no phenomenal character whatsoever. It is a
13I use the terms ‘looking’ and ‘visually aware’ interchangeably. A diﬀerent sense of ‘looking’ is one in
which I am actively attending. Active visual attention has its own phenomenal character such as the
sense of eﬀort in controlling one’s attention. Metzinger (2017) posits a model of mental agency (includ-
ing controlled attention and deliberate thinking) which contributes to a phenomenal self-model. This is
a diﬀerent phenomenology from what I mean by ‘looking’ and ‘visually aware’. There is a sense of being
visually aware even when one is not actively controlling visual attention, or so I claim.
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complete absence of experience. We investigate this alternative further in
the next experiment.
3.4. Experiment 3: pure blind spot and blind spot by vacancy
(1) Pure blind spot: Look directly ahead and move your hand slowly to the
left. Notice that your hand begins to blur and eventually disappears
altogether. You have found the limit of your visual ﬁeld. Notice that
unlike the boundaries of things there is nothing outside of it. For
example, I see the edges of the table because it is in a surrounding
environment such as the room. But ‘outside’ of my visual ﬁeld, I can see
nothing whatsoever. Beyond the limits of the visual ﬁeld, I ﬁnd a true
blind spot, a pure visual absence. The visual scene just ends. (2) Blind
spot by vacancy. If I merely experience nothing where I am looking from,
if it is a pure blind spot like beyond the limits of my visual ﬁeld, then
what it is like to attend here should be exactly the same as there. Point
oﬀ to the side and attend to that spot. I am pointing at nothing whatso-
ever, no things, no colours, no shapes, and there is nothing it is like to
experience that location. It is a bare lack of visual experience. Now by con-
trast point at where you are looking from. There is a phenomenal diﬀer-
ence between the two spots. I am again pointing at no things, colours,
or shapes, but there is something it is like to attend here. Rather than
no experience at all, there is a phenomenal character of spacious empti-
ness. This is a more like a blind spot by vacancy than a pure blind spot. I
experience this location like I do a hole, not the same as the complete
lack of phenomenal character when I try to attend to what is beyond
my visual ﬁeld.
3.5. Experiment 4: blind spots and the aware spot
I experience this location like a gap, but is it merely a gap? The question of
this experiment is where seems to be the location of the looker. (1) Blind
spot by vacancy: Point to the gap formed by an open doorway. In a sense
you are pointing at nothing. I seem to be pointing at no shapes or colours
and not at the looker. (2) Aware Spot. Now point towards where others see
your face. There is a phenomenal diﬀerence between the gap of the
doorway and this spot. Again, there are no shapes and colours, but I am
also seemingly pointing at the looker, or the locus of visual awareness.
While pointing here Douglas Harding asks us to notice:
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Whether what I’m pointing at is face-like or space-like, human or non-human, a
thing or nothing, small and bounded or limitless, dead to itself or alive - alive to
Itself, in all Its blazing obviousness and uniqueness. (Harding 1992, 27)
A gap in a doorway has a spacious emptiness to it simpliciter. By con-
trast, this spot is awake to the ﬁnger and the room. This is seemingly
a spacious emptiness that is aware. Rather than being a mere blind
spot, this is apparently an aware-spot, in fact, it is the only aware-spot
I can ﬁnd. Critically, there is a phenomenal difference between the
two types of vacancy, and this experience of awareness is non-sensory
in character.
3.5. Interpreting the results of the experiments
I am self-evidently aware. I had assumed with common sense that I am
looking out of a thing – out of two eyes in a solid, opaque ball. That is,
I had assumed that I am a person that is aware. However, when I
attend in this direction – when I attend to who or what is looking –
there is no person. There are apparently no eyes, nor cheeks, nor
hair here, neither are there shapes or colours. I seem to be attending
to an open space, not a thing. Taking my experience as I ﬁnd it, it is
a no-thing that is aware, rather than a thing.14 Rather than nothing,
or a pure lack of experience, this can be described as an aware-
space (Harding 1996, 83; Harding 1988, 135), or aware-capacity
(Harding 1992, 28).
Importantly, there is a non-sensory phenomenal diﬀerence between
this spot and a mere gap – that it seems to be aware. Neither is this
sense of awareness an object of awareness. I am not aware of it as
objects of awareness such as trees, houses, my body, feelings or thoughts.
I am aware of these things, while I am apparently aware as this space. The
target arguably ﬁts the characteristics of what we were searching for,
namely, pure awareness.
4. Spatial visual structure and the viewpoint
One may suspect that the experiments rely upon the spatial structure of
vision, that is, visual space as experienced from a ﬁrst-person point of
view. Examples include left, right, in front. There is also the central point
in vision, the viewpoint. The visible side of things apparently face this
14Thanks to Robert Penny for highlighting these important points to me. See Richard Lang on the obser-
vation that I am self-evidently aware (Lang 2003, 8).
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centre in egocentric space.15 Non-Egocentric space, on the other hand, has
coordinates that are not relative to a point of view, such as north, west and
south. This type of space has no viewpoint or centre which things face.
Campbell (1994, 119) distinguishes between monadic and relational ego-
centric information. ‘X is to the left’ is an example of a monadic egocentric
property.16 ‘X is to the left of me’ is an example of an egocentric relation.
He holds that the visual information does not have an inbuilt reference to
the subject but rather is monadic. However, a relational description can
also exclude a speciﬁc reference to a subject.17 Things are seen as
located to the left of centre and right of centre, and at a distance from
here. Perhaps then it is just built into visual experience that things are
at a distance from here, and this explains the sense of awareness or the
looker being here. The advantage of this proposal is that it would
provide an invariant structure to visual experience to account for the phe-
nomenology. Do I seem to be pointing at the looker because I am pointing
at the viewpoint?
If the experience is reducible to the spatial aspects of the visual ﬁeld
such as the viewpoint then closing my eyes should eliminate the sense
that I am looking from here and hence the sense of being aware. The
ﬁnal experiment is from Deikman (1996) who uses a method of contrast
for distinguishing awareness.
4.1. Experiment 5: eyes closed experiment
Look straight ahead. Now shut your eyes. The rich visual world has disappeared
to be replaced by an amorphous ﬁeld of blackness, perhaps with red and yellow
tinges. But awareness hasn’t changed. You will notice that awareness continues
as your thoughts come and go, as memories arise and replace each other, as
desires emerge and fantasies develop, change and vanish. (Deikman 1996, 351)
When I close my eyes my experience of awareness does not change. When
the lights go out, if anything, the experienced polarity between the
observing aspect and the observed (the blackness) is even more salient.
This is the case even though there is no three-dimensional spatial infor-
mation and arguably no viewpoint. For example, a photo of a street
scene has a viewpoint which things face and recede into the distance
15For further discussion on egocentric information see Peacocke (1992, chapter 3) on scenarios, and Ber-
múdez (1998, chapter 5) on self-specifying information in vision.
16Colours are another example of monadic visual properties.
17Casullo (1986, 1989) argues that objects have their positions in perceptual space in virtue of monadic
position properties, while Falkenstein (1989) argues in favour of relations.
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from. However, a photo of a totally dark room represents nothing but
blackness – it does not represent a viewpoint. If it does depict a viewpoint
it is only in a very abstract sense of the term, like a centre of gravity. This
suggests that there is also no viewpoint when I close my eyes.
Perhaps the dots or the even blackness are experienced as being some
distance away? This is worth considering, though it is far from clear to me.
Even if there is sometimes a sense of distance, much of the time there is
just blackness with no depth at all. If this is correct, it shows that the sense
that the looker is here is not reducible to the visual viewpoint.
Perhaps there is other spatial information that can explain the invariant
aspect when one closes one’s eyes. For example, there are other central
points in egocentric space such as in the proprioceptive ﬁeld and the audi-
tory ﬁeld. This proposal raises a number of puzzles. The central points in
vision and proprioception are diﬀerent, at least it is not clear that the
centre of proprioceptive experience coincides with the head. This raises
the question of which centre I seem to be located at. I do not seem to sud-
denly shift centre when I close my eyes. It is not even clear that there is a
single central point in proprioceptive experience. Perhaps, the centre of
the auditory ﬁeld is approximately where the head is apparently located,
but what about when everything is completely silent? Does the sense of
awareness disappear in a totally dark and silent room? These sources of
information seem to be too variable to explain the invariance of the
observing aspect.
These objections can be avoided by positing a multi-modal central
point. This central point would not depend upon any one sense, but
would rather serve as the central point of all the senses. Blanke and Met-
zinger (2009, 8) describe this as:
A purely geometrical feature of a perceptual or imagined model of reality pos-
sessing a point of projection functioning as its origin in sensory and mental pro-
cessing, but is not linked with theoretically more charged notions such as
‘subject of experience’. (Blanke and Metzinger 2009)18
However, this proposal suffers from a more pressing problem which also
applies to the viewpoint. The critical question is: Why I should seem to
be looking from here rather than somewhere else? I honestly do not
know. Why should I seem, as the looker, to be at this central point
rather than at a peripheral point? This is entirely mysterious. Locating a
central point is not the same as me seeming to look from that point.
18See Dainton (2016) for a similar proposal.
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What explains the phenomenal difference between a mere gap in a
doorway and my apparently looking from the gap where others see my
face? It seems that we need an extra phenomenal ingredient. If this is
correct then there is more to the phenomenology than just a central
point. Something further it seems is required to ﬁx ‘the observer’ at a
central sensory point. We are back then to the invariant sense of being
aware that we set out to explain in the ﬁrst place.
Another way in which phenomenology goes beyond the viewpoint is its
character of spacious emptiness. This apparently empty region from which
I seem to be looking is not experienced as a mere point but as an
unbounded opening. It would be better not to say that I ﬁnd a view-
point where I am looking from, but a view-space. Unlike a mere point
which cannot contain anything, this transparent opening encompasses
the visual scene. This seemingly blank region also remains distinguishable
from the darkness when I close my eyes. Schwitzgebel (2011) asked sub-
jects to introspect what it was like with their eyes closed. He inquired
if it seemed to them that they experienced blackness or grayness or anything
else visual in the region behind their heads and beyond the farthest boundary
of their peripheral vision, or whether it seemed instead empty or blank – not
black, but rather entirely devoid of visual experience. All expressed the view
that beyond the visual periphery it was visually blank, not black. (Schwitzgebel
2011, 152–153)
I would say from my experience that I seem to be this blank space which
encompasses the darkness. When I close my eyes, the contents of this
aware-space change from a multi-coloured scene to darkness, but the
space itself remains unchanged.
5. Conclusion
Moore held that philosophers have not recognised the centrality of aware-
ness to the problem of consciousness because ‘they have not been able to
hold it and blue before their minds and to compare them, in the same way
in which they can compare blue and green’ (Moore 1903, 450). I presented
a series of ﬁrst-person experiments developed by Douglas Harding for
experiencing awareness by contrasting it with objects of awareness. I
found that the sense that I am looking from here (where others see my
face), ﬁts the characteristics of pure awareness in that it has a non-
sensory phenomenal character and is not experienced as an object of
awareness; in particular, this gap ﬁts the description of a ‘luminous
emptiness’.
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If the descriptions provided here are correct then when Moore uses the
terms ‘transparent’, and ‘emptiness’ in regards to awareness, these turn
out to be more than metaphorical ﬂourishes, but actually describe a dis-
tinguishable aspect of the structure of experience. Sartre’s (1957, 40)
view on consciousness was also close to that of pure awareness stating
that ‘All is… clear and lucid in consciousness: the object with its character-
istic opacity is before consciousness, but consciousness is purely and
simply consciousness of being consciousness of that object’. Awareness
is clear, and it is because of its perfect clarity that its contribution to
phenomenal life tends not to be recognised.
That awareness is experientially distinguishable from objects of aware-
ness is not to posit that there is a metaphysical duality between awareness
and objects of awareness. For Buddhist thinkers such as Dignāga, aware-
ness and objects of awareness are aspects of a single unity, and hence
they are not separable (Hattori 1968; Ho 2007, 216). Harding holds that
because awareness is in total contrast to the things it’s aware of, they
are absolutely united. ‘Paradoxically,’ Harding states, ‘just because this
Space is absolutely unlike and absolutely uncontaminated by its contents,
it is absolutely identiﬁed with them. I don’t believe this, I see it. The Space
is the things that occupy it. This Stillness–Silence is the motions and the
sounds of which it is the background’ (Harding 1961, 60).
Consider how this gap and the objects it encompasses diﬀer from rela-
tive opposites such as black and white. A thing cannot be both entirely
black and entirely white simultaneously. Black and white cannot be
present at the same location except by mixing to create grey. Black and
white are incompatible because they are both colours on the colour con-
tinuum.19 However, this aware-gap is compatible with objects because
they are absolute opposites. There are no colours or shapes here to
conﬂict with the colours and shapes of objects, and thus they are perfectly
uniﬁed.20 On a practical note, Harding (1967, 1986, 1990, 2000) highlights
the potential beneﬁts of a conscious ‘headlessness’ for my being open to
others. In my ﬁrst-person experience I am never face-to-face with others,
but rather face-to-no-face. Nothing gets in the way between myself and
19Technically speaking, according to physics, black and white are not colours at all. Black is an absence of
reﬂected light, and white is a mixture of red, green, and blue light. I am using ‘colour’ here in the way it
is employed in ordinary languages such that ‘black’ and ‘white’ count as basic categories of colour (Berlin
and Kay 1969).
20This type of non-duality by absolute unity is distinct from non-duality by extinction of the object as
reportedly occurs for objectless pure awareness experiences. It is also distinct from non-duality by
extinction of awareness (or the subject), such as in states of absorption in the object. An in-depth analy-
sis of non-duality goes beyond the scope of the present paper.
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the other’s face. I don’t confront them – I am replaced by them (Harding
1967, 48).
This aware spot was also found to be impersonal in that it seemingly
lacks all personally identifying characteristics such as gender, personality,
social identity etc. To be more precise we should call this a ‘zero-person
experience’.21 The delusion I usually live from is that there is a person or
observing thing (Harding 2001, 15) (who is the subject) residing at the
centre of my phenomenal world. I propose rather that the subject is aware-
ness itself, and it is egoless and impersonal (Albahari 2006, 2009; Deikman
1996; Forman 1999; Harding 1988, 110, 2000, 102; Shear 1998). Egos and
persons are objects of awareness, not the subject. Neither is this aware-
gap bounded by anything (I experience nothing outside of it). This gap
is not separate from the visual scene. There is apparently no dividing
line, between it and the scene. They are seemingly totally uniﬁed. If by
‘self’ then we mean an ontologically separate thing with personally iden-
tifying characteristics, and if we take phenomenology as a guide to meta-
physics, then as a boundless, non-separate, and impersonal non-thing, this
aware-space is selﬂess.22
The experiments presented here assist in isolating a phenomenal diﬀer-
ence, however they do not dictate which language should be used to
describe it. For the conscientious sceptic the present methods provide a
means for further investigation. Scepticism is an essential part of the scien-
tiﬁc attitude. As part of a rigorous ﬁrst-person approach, scepticism should
also be applied to our common-sense beliefs as well, not to mention hal-
lowed philosophical and spiritual beliefs. If, as some claim, awareness is
not an object or process in the world, then it is literally unlike any phenom-
enon so far investigated by third-person science.23 Harding (1992, 86) on
the experience of awareness states: ‘The reason I can’t tell (you)… what
it’s like is that it isn’t like anything, that it diﬀers absolutely from everything
it’s conscious of’. Many meditative traditions hold that pure awareness
exists, and where I am apparently looking from seems to be the best
‘place’ to ﬁnd it.
Eastern and mystical descriptions of consciousness have typically
been discounted on the grounds that they are merely cultural artefacts
(Katz 1978), non-veriﬁable, and too ‘esoteric’ to enter the realms of
21For Harding on the ﬁrst-person as zero, see Harding (2001, 14–15). There is a broader sense of ‘ﬁrst-
person experience’ in which is it is that which is had by me, whatever ‘I’ turn out to be.
22See Albahari (2006, 2011) on the distinction between the subject and personal selves. I argue elsewhere
that the gap is the subject of experience (Ramm, 2017).
23For an argument that ﬁrst-person science complements and completes third-person science, see Harding
(2001).
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scientiﬁc study. Indeed, a major problem has always been how to study
a conscious ‘state’ that is reported by only a small number of individuals
and one that even for them is not always reliably accessible. Rather than
being a state that only occurs under very unusual conditions or after
years of meditation, Harding’s experiments provide results that can be
replicated at any time. Even if an agreement on describing the experi-
ence is diﬃcult to achieve (not to mention agreement on the metaphys-
ical implications), it is signiﬁcant progress to identify a candidate for
pure awareness and reliable methods for experiencing it. Harding’s
experiments hence indicate a new avenue of investigation in the
science of consciousness.
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